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CLD-100        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 11-4392 
___________ 
 
JAY L. THOMAS, 
            Appellant 
 
v. 
 
ADVANCE HOUSING, INC. 
____________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil No. 3-11-cv-01426) 
District Judge:  Honorable Peter G. Sheridan 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to 
Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
January 26, 2012 
 
Before: RENDELL, HARDIMAN and ROTH, Circuit 
 
Judges 
(Opinion filed: April 3, 2012) 
_________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Jay L. Thomas appeals pro se the order of the District Court entering final 
judgment in favor of the defendants.  Because we conclude that this appeal presents no 
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substantial question, we will summarily affirm.  See
I. 
 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
 On March 23, 2011, plaintiff Jay L. Thomas filed a pro se complaint in District 
Court against Advance Housing, Inc. (“Advance Housing”) making claims of gross 
negligence and breach of contract pursuant to the New Jersey Law Against 
Discrimination.1  Advance Housing is a non-profit that provides supportive housing and 
services to adults with mental health disabilities.  Thomas was its client from 2002 
through 2008.  He alleges that Advance Housing mistreated him—including denying him 
proper medical attention and medication and denying him transportation to a food 
pantry—due to his race and disability.  The incidents, as alleged, occurred in February 
2008 through April 2008.  Thomas terminated the relationship in May 2008.  Advance 
Housing filed a motion to dismiss, which the District Court granted, concluding that it 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction.  Thomas then filed a motion to amend the complaint 
and a proposed (eighth)2
                                                 
1 Thomas first filed a complaint in New Jersey Superior Court in March 2010 alleging 
that Advance Housing discriminated against him on the basis of his race and disability.  
In January 2011, Thomas moved to voluntarily dismiss the complaint in order to re-file in 
District Court; the Superior Court denied the motion in February 2011.  Nonetheless, 
Thomas filed an identical complaint in the District Court on March 14, 2011.  The 
Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of Advance Housing in August 2011.  
Because of our disposition of this case, we do not reach the questions of claim or issue 
preclusion.   
 amended complaint.  The District Court denied the motion and 
Thomas appealed.  We determined that the District Court improperly denied Thomas’ 
 
2 It appears that Thomas amended his state court complaint several times, and continued 
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amended complaint, which included a claim under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act.  Such 
a claim raised a federal question and would have conferred subject matter jurisdiction.  
Thus, we vacated the District Court’s order and remanded for further proceedings.  (C.A. 
No. 11-2581.) 
Upon remand, the District Court reopened the case and ordered Thomas’ eighth 
amended complaint filed.  On August 22, 2011, Advance Housing filed a motion to 
dismiss the eighth amended complaint, arguing that Thomas’ discrimination claims were 
time-barred, and that the District Court lacked jurisdiction over the remaining contract 
claim.  In response to Thomas’ claim that he had properly removed the action from state 
court to federal court, thereby preserving his claims within the statute of limitations, the 
District Court scheduled a hearing and invited Thomas to file an additional response to 
the motion and to submit a request to further amend his complaint.  Thomas failed to file 
a response or appear for the hearing.  The District Court dismissed Thomas’ sixth, 
seventh, ninth, tenth, and eleventh amended complaints3
II. 
, and subsequently granted 
Advance Housing’s motion to dismiss the eighth amended complaint.  Thomas filed a 
timely notice of appeal of the order dismissing the eighth amended complaint. 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over 
                                                                                                                                                             
counting in federal court. 
 
3 Thomas also appealed this non-final order dismissing his sixth, seventh, ninth, tenth, 
and eleventh complaints.  (C.A. 11-4146.) 
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the District Court’s dismissal pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 
12(b)(6).  See McTernan v. City of York, Pa.
III. 
, 577 F.3d 521, 526 (3d Cir. 2009).   
Advance Housing moved to dismiss Thomas’ claims under Title VI and the Law 
Against Discrimination as being filed beyond the applicable statutes of limitations and to 
dismiss the contract claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  In federal civil rights 
cases, courts look to the statute of limitations for personal injury actions.  See Wilson v. 
Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67 (1985).  New Jersey’s personal injury statute of limitations 
period is two years, and applies to claims brought under the New Jersey Law Against 
Discrimination.  Montells v. Haynes, 627 A.2d 654, 658-59 (N.J. 1993).  The same two-
year limitations period should be applied to claims analogous to a personal injury action 
under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act.  See Wilson, 471 U.S. at 276; Taylor v. Regents of 
University of California, 993 F.2d 710, 712 (9th Cir. 1993) (claims under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983 and Title VI are governed by the same statute of limitations); Bougher v. Univ. of 
Pittsburgh
Before the District Court ruled on Advance Housing’s motion to dismiss, Thomas 
filed a notice of appeal.  To the extent it is relevant in this appeal, he argued that he had 
, 882 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1989) (applying Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of 
limitations for personal injury actions to claims under the similarly structured Title IX).  
In its motion to dismiss, Advance Housing argued that Thomas’ federal suit, filed in 
March 2011, was more than two years after May 2008, the last date on which Advance 
Housing, Inc. could have discriminated against him or mistreated him.  
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“properly removed [the] action” pursuant to Thompson v. Cent. Ohio R.R. Co., 73 U.S. 
134 (1867).  He also complained that the Superior Court’s February 2011 denial of his 
request to “withdraw and remove and refile in District Court” was a “usurpation” of 
power.  He repeats those arguments in a document filed in this Court titled “Amended 
Appeal,” and believes that the “removal” preserved the filing deadline in state court.  
However, it is not clear to what Thomas is referring in his argument that he “properly 
removed [the] action.”  No removal is on the District Court’s docket; Thomas fails to 
show that he removed the case from state court at all.  In any event, plaintiffs cannot 
remove suits to federal court, see 28 U.S.C. § 1441, and Thompson
Advance Housing also argued that because Thomas’ claims of discrimination 
under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act 
were time-barred and must be dismissed, the District Court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction over his contract law claims.  We understand the effect of the District Court’s 
dismissal order to be a refusal to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law 
 does not support his 
position.  Further, we are aware of no authority that would support his attempt to preserve 
the time to file by filing a state court action, withdrawing, and then re-filing a complaint 
in federal court.  Additionally, it may be that the Thomas first raised the federal Title VI 
claim in his eighth amended complaint in District Court, which further damages his claim 
that his state court action preserved the filing period.  Accordingly, because his March 
2011 complaint was filed well after the two-year limitations period had run, the District 
Court properly dismissed these claims. 
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contract claim.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).  Given our conclusion that the District Court 
properly dismissed Thomas’ federal claims, any exercise of supplemental jurisdiction 
over the contract claim would not have been warranted.  See Hedges v. Musco
IV. 
, 204 F.3d 
109, 123 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 Because the appeal does not present a substantial question, we will summarily 
affirm the District Court’s order.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.   
